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Human Rights and Arms Transfer Policy*
CEDRIC W. TARR, JR.**
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper will attempt to assess the impact of human
rights considerations on arms transfer policy since 1973 when
Congress began to pressure the Executive branch to insert the
human rights factor into the decisionmaking process. Arms
transfer policy is defined to include the provision of military
equipment and training by means of grants and credits, plus
government regulation of commercial sales. Arms transfers
have become, since the Second World War, a principal ingredi-
ent of American foreign policy. A variety of purposes can be
identified: the containment of communism; the forestallment
of regional military imbalances in order to promote stability
and reduce the chances of conflict; the maintenance of favor-
able relations, hopefully to influence countries which request
arms; to establish/improve transit rights; to support/promote
specific regimes; to increase economic incentives such as reduc-
ing balance of payments deficts; and to maintain markets in
the face of competition from other suppliers. The effort to use
arms transfer policy as a means of improving the human rights
performance of foreign regimes has added a new purpose. No
attempt will be made to evaluate the effectiveness of arms
transfers in reaching these goals, nor to explore the larger ques-
tion of whether or not human rights should be an important
ingredient of U.S. foreign policy. The emphasis will be on the
process by which human rights considerations have been built
into foreign policy decisions.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WEAVERS IN CONGRESS
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, before the
Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance in March 1977,
stated that "[t]he concern for human rights will be woven into
the fabric of our foreign policy."' This process was actually
* Adapted from a paper prepared for a presentation to the Midwest Regional
Conference of the International Studies Association, May 6, 1978.
** Professor of Political Science, Chairman, Political Science Department, Met-
ropolitan State College (Denver).
1. Human Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance of the
574 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
begun in 1973 as a result of congressional prodding of a reluc-
tant Executive branch where Henry Kissinger continued to
preside over U.S. foreign policy. Kissinger made no secret of his
lack of interest in altering the fabric of his policy:
We have generally opposed attempts to deal with sensitive inter-
national human rights issues through legislation, not because of
the moral view expressed, which we share, but because legislation
is almost always too inflexible, too public, and too heavy
handed a means to accomplish what it seeks.
Through quiet diplomacy, this Administration has brought
about the release or parole of hundreds of prisoners throughout
the world and mitigated repressive conditions in numerous coun-
tries. But we have seldom publicized specific successes
The International Organizations and Movements Subcom-
mittee, chaired by Rep. Donald Fraser, of the House Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs held a series of fifteen hearings beginning
in August 1973. 3 The purpose was to propose recommendations
for "raising the priority given to human rights in U.S. foreign
policy, and strengthening the capacity of international organi-
zations to insure protection of human rights. 4 The final report
included twenty-nine specific recommendations,5 including the
one which urged the Department of State to "treat human
rights factors as a regular part of U.S. foreign policy decision-
making," and to "prepare human rights impact statements for
all policies which have significant human rights implications. "I
Going beyond recommendation, Congress began to insert
human rights provisions into legislation. Section 32 of the For-
eign Assistance Act of 19731 expressed the sense of the Congress
that "the President should deny any economic or military as-
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations 62, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
2. Kissinger, Moral Promise and Practical Needs, 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. 597, 603
(1976).
3. International Protection of Human Rights: The Work of International Organi-
zations and the Role of U.S. Foreign Policy, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings].
4. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS OF
THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: A
CALL FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP, 93D CONG., 2D SESS. (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT].
5. Id. at 3-8.
6. Id.




sistance to the government of any foreign country which prac-
tices the internment or imprisonment of that country's citizens
for political purposes.""
What was to become the major legislative guideline was
placed in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, section 502B.
Introduced by Representative Fraser, it stated that:
(a) It is the sense of Congress that, except in extraordinary
circumstances, the President shall substantially reduce or termi-
nate security assistance to any government which engages in a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recog-
nized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without
charges; or other flagrant denials of the right to life, liberty, and
the security of the person.
(b) Whenever proposing or furnishing security assistance to any
government falling within the provisions of paragraph (a), the
President shall advise the Congress of the extraordinary circum-
stance necessitating the assistance. 0
In paragraph (b) Congress first crossed the threshhold
from recommending to requiring by placing a reporting require-
ment on the Executive. The Department of State had re-
sponded to the growing congressional prodding by making a
number of small changes" in order to give the appearance of
cooperation without actually making the fundamental changes
in the substance and process of foreign policy implied by the
various resolutions and recommendations.
In response to section 32 regarding political prisoners,
American embassies were asked to report on the situation in
their countries and to make the foreign governments aware of
section 32 as a warning. Subsequently, the State Department
broadened the subject matter to include: torture, arbitrary ar-
rest and detention, arbitrary curtailment of existing political
rights, unlawful killing and seriously unfair trials. 2
8. 1974 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 4, at 3-8.
9. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 502B, 88 Stat. 1795, 1815
(1974).
10. Id.
11. Salzberg & Young, The Parliamentary Role in Implementing International
Human Rights: A US. Example, 12 TEx. INT'L L. J. 251, 275 (1977).
12. SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS, 95TH CONG., 1sT SEss., HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COM-
MUNITY AND IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1976, 47 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter
cited as 1977 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT].
1979
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However, the response to the reporting requirement in sec-
tion 502B was not considered satisfactory. Secretary of State
Kissinger, in November of 1975, declined to allow a country-
by-country report to be released and substituted a report indi-
cating that all countries violate human rights, and that it
would not be in the national interest to single out specific viola-
tors. 3 Congress responded by including in the International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976,1 a
stronger version of section 502,15 which was vetoed by President
Ford on the ground that it permitted Congress to terminate,
restrict, or continue security assistance for any country found
in violation of human rights by means of a concurrent resolu-
tion, which is not subject to veto." Still another version of 502B
was subsequently adopted by both houses which was essen-
tially the same as the one that had been vetoed, except that it
stipulated congressional termination by means of a joint reso-
lution rather than a concurrent resolution, which satisfied the
Administration's requirements.
The revised section 502B states that it is the policy of the
United States to promote and encourage increased respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and that, ex-
cept under special circumstances, "no security assistance may
be provided to any country the government of which engages
in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights."' 7 Such violations are defined as:
torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-
ment; prolonged detention without charges and trial; and other
flagrant denials of the right to life, liberty, or the security of
person.
The Secretary of State may still attempt to provide
security assistance if he can convince Congress that "[e]xtra-
ordinary circumstances exist which necessitate a continua-
tion of security assistance .... , No examples of what
13. Id. at 57-58.
14. 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1976).
15. Id. § 2304(a)(2). For a thorough analysis of § 502, see Weissbrodt, Human
Rights Legislation and US. Foreign Policy, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 231, 241-87
(1977).
16. S. 2662, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See, 122 CONG. Rac. S6715-16 (daily ed.
May 10, 1976).
17. 1977 HUMAN RIGHTS REPoRT, supra note 12, at 53.
18. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(c)(C)(i) (1976).
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might constitute extraordinary circumstances were provided.
The Secretary of State is required to furnish annually to Con-
gress, along with the supporting materials, a full and complete
report on the human rights practices in each country,"9 which
is proposed as a security assistance recipient. In order to reduce
the possibility of a whitewash, section 502B requires that the
findings of appropriate international organizations be taken
into consideration in the preparation of the report. The extent
to which these organizations have been given access for their
investigations by the governments in question is also to be
considered.
Should the Senate or the House, or their relevant commit-
tees, at any time request a report on a specific country the
Secretary of State must respond within thirty days. 0 If the
report is not received in that time, all security assistance will
be terminated until a report is received. When a report is re-
ceived, Congress may still terminate, restrict, or continue assis-
tance by means of a joint resolution.
Finally, the revised version of section 502B sought to rein-
force these provisions by requiring the establishment in the
Department of State of a Coordinator for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs, to report directly to the Secretary of
State. This official would be appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate. The Coordinator would
have responsibilities in the areas of refugees, prisoners of war,
and U.S. military personnel missing'in action, as well as
human rights. In addition to reviewing, analyzing, and gather-
ing information, the Coordinator would have responsibility for
preparing the required reports. It was also directed that the
Secretary of State "shall carry out his responsibility under sec-
tion 502B of the Act through the Coordinator for Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs."'21 Congress was clearly trying to
legislate a substantive change in the decisionmaking process
and was aware that the creation of new institutions is, by itself,
no guarantee. The first Coordinator's office was staffed with
one Foreign Service Officer and one deputy, to compile reports.
19. Id. § 2304(b).
20. Id. § 2304(c)(1).
21. 1977 HuMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 12, at 55.
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Congress also used the more direct method of terminating
or reducing military aid to specific countries. Starting in 1974,
military assistance to Chile was eliminated and limits were
placed on the amount of economic assistance that could be
provided.2 In the case of South Korea, where security consider-
ations are more apparent than in Chile, military assistance was
limited until the U.S. President reported that significant prog-
ress had been made in the observance of human rights.23 The
President was also instructed to express forcefully to the gov-
ernment of South Korea the American concern over the erosion
of human rights. Thus, Congress demonstrated its willingness
to apply the human rights standard selectively, depending
upon individual circumstances. In 1976 Congress prohibited
military assistance to Uruguay.
2
III. ARMS TRANSFERS AND THE NEW ADMINISTRATION
A campaign pledge of Jimmy Carter's was to return moral-
ity and idealism to American foreign policy. A Carter foreign
policy would make human rights a major factor in the formula-
tion of policy. Carter also pledged to reduce American arms
transfers to other countries on the grounds that being the
world's major arms supplier set a bad example and was not
consistent with the goals of peace and arms control. Thus, with
the advent of a new administration, Congress gained an ally in
the cause of human rights. Within a year the position of the
newly designated Coordinator for Human Rights, Patricia
Derian, had been upgraded to that of Assistant Secretary of
State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, in charge
of a Bureau (HA), which has as one of its three main subdivi-
sions, an Office of Human Rights. Arms transfer policy is han-
dled in this office. Human Rights Officers have also been desig-
nated at each U.S. Embassy to engage in ongoing monitoring
and reporting of the local human rights situation. Additionally,
in other parts of the State Department, such as Policy Plan-
ning, the Legal Division, and International Organizations,
22. International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-329, § 406, 90 Stat. 729, 758. See also, Salzberg, supra note 11, at 263-66.
23. Salzberg, supra note 11, at 266-69.
24. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1977, Pub. L.
No. 94-441, § 505, 90 Stat. 1465, 1473 (1976); see also, 122 CONG. REc. S16406 (daily
ed. Sept. 22, 1976).
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there are people with responsibilities in the human rights
areas. Human rights policy is also being included in the train-
ing programs of the Foreign Service and military services.
However, the fact that the new Administration was com-
mitted to placing greater emphasis on the human rights factor
did not prevent Congress from continuing to use its powers over
appropriations, and over Executive branch organization to in-
fluence both the process and the substance of foreign assistance
policies. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY 1978,
required a full report from the Secretary of State by January
31, 1978 on the steps that had been, and were being, taken to
"strengthen human rights and humanitarian considerations in
the conduct of United States foreign policy.
125
IV. THE POLICY PROCESS
There are two general categories of military assistance.
One is commercial sales from an American company to a for-
eign government, requiring a license from the U.S. Govern-
ment. The other category is government-to-government trans-
actions. These can be in the form of foreign military credits, or
sales (FMS), grant military assistance (MAP), security sup-
porting assistance (SSA), and international military education
and training (IMET).
The time between the first request and the actual delivery
of the items may be as long as three years. The system is
tortuous and sluggish because of the complex clearance process
in the Executive branch and a congressional phase which can
involve as many as eight separate hearings. Formalization of
the human rights factor has simply inserted another hurdle,
another potential point of delay, into an already cumbersome
process.
A. Phase One-The Department of State
A request from a foreign government is first evaluated in
the regional bureau which involves the Department of Defense
on questions of military and technological implications. The
desk officer or country director then evaluates the political
considerations.
The Bureau's human rights officer may get involved at this
stage. Informally, the human rights factor has to be kept in
25. 124 CONG. REc. S1422-1426 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1978).
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mind by all concerned simply because an independent office of
advocacy, backed at the highest policy levels has joined the
circuit. It is also possible for a request to be turned down at this
stage for reasons other than human rights, e.g., if the request-
ing government has not made a convincing case of need, or if
Bureau policy forbids certain types of equipment. The Latin
American bureau, for example, will not approve requests for
export licenses for incendiary munitions, silencers, and other
items which appear to lack a legitimate function.26
Beyond this, President Carter, following up on his pledge
to reduce the American role as arms merchant, in a statement
on May 17, 1977, placed added restrictions on conventional
arms transfers through FMA and MAP. The restrictions apply
to all countries except those with which the U.S. has major
defense treaties (NATO, Japan, Australia, New Zealand). Ac-
cording to one analysis, however, this new policy has not yet
resulted in significant restraint in the use of arms transfers as
a tool of foreign policy.27
The Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM) looks at the
proposed arms transfer (in the case of major items) from the
standpoint of regional and global implications and also drafts
the regional Bureau's justification. Although PM's role is that
of neutral reviewer and drafter, the human rights advocates in
the State Department do not regard it as particularly sympa-
thetic to their cause.
The arms request takes the form of an Action Memo which
circulates back through the regional bureau and to HA. Policy
Planning then looks at all of the arguments to evaluate the
justifications and possibly to challenge weak points. If disa-
greements are not worked out at the Bureau level, the issue can
be referred to the Undersecretary of State for Security Assis-
tance, and then possibly to the Secretary of State.
An interdepartmental group, the Arms Export Control
Board (AECB) was established by the new Administration to
have jurisdiction over all aspects of its arms transfer policy.
26. Interview with Col. Stuart Quigg, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (March
1978).
27. Shandler, Implications of President Carter's Conventional Arms Transfer
Policy, Cong. Research Serv. 77-223 F (Sept. 22, 1977), at 99.
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The Assistant Secretary for HA is a permanent member, as are
representatives from PM, DOD, NSC, OMB, Treasury, CIA,
and ACDA. The AECB has responsibility for overall policy and
procedures for arms transfers, but does not usually act as a
review and clearance committee to consider specific recom-
mendations emerging from the arms transfer bureaucracy in
the State Department. This function is by statute the sole
responsibility of the State Department, which is not anxious to
bring other departments into the system.
By contrast, recommendations for economic assistance are
reviewed on a case by case basis by a new interdepartmental
committee chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State, Warren
Christopher. The Inter-Agency Committee on Human Rights
and Foreign Assistance includes representatives from HA and
others from the State Department, along with DOD, Com-
merce, Agriculture, Treasury, NSC, OPIC, AID, and U.S. par-
ticipants from international financial institutions. There have
been complaints that the "Christopher Committee" is a major
bottleneck in the clearance process.
When the annual arms transfer package is finally ap-
proved, the request, with supporting material, is sent to Con-
gress. Section 502B requires that this include a report on the
human rights conditions in every country recommended for
military assistance. This becomes part of the public record, a
practice Kissinger tried unsuccessfully to prevent.
The first full set of reports, prepared by the State Depart-
ment under the Ford Administration, included eighty-two
countries and was transmitted to the Congress in April 1977.2
As a result, five Latin American countries renounced their re-
quests for military aid: El Salvador, Argentina, Brazil, Guate-
mala, and Uruguay.
The second set of reports was submitted in February 1978
and included 105 nations. The larger number results from an
amendment of section 116 of the International Development
and Food Assistance Act of 1977 which requires a human rights
report on all nations recommended for development assistance.
There were even more entries in the third set (115) because
28. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTs PRACriCES IN CouNTmEs RECEIVING
U.S. SEcURIT ASSISTANCE, 95TH CONG., iST SEss. (Comm. Print 1977).
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President Carter ordered that countries requesting police and
civil law enforcement aid also be included in the human rights
review process (Presidential Determination #30, February 17,
1978).
Each country report is divided into four sections:
1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Tor-
ture; Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;
Arbitrary Arrest or Imprisonment; Denial of Fair Public Trial;
Invasion of the Home.
2. Governmental Policies Relating to the Fulfillment of
Such Vital Needs as Food, Shelter, Health Care, and Educa-
tion.
3. Respect for Civil and Political Liberties, Including
Freedom of Thought, Speech, Press, Religion, and Assembly;
Freedom of Movement Within the Country; Foreign Travel and
Emigration; Freedom to Participate in the Political Process.
4. Government Attitude and Record Regarding Interna-
tional and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Viola-
tions of Human Rights.n
The State Department does not interpret any part of sec-
tion 502B to require either a ranking of nations according to
their human rights record on a scale of good to bad, or the
establishment of some sort of blacklist of gross and consistent
violators, although anyone is free to use the reports for that
purpose. Pressure to do this has been resisted. Patricia Derian
was castigated for refusing to do so by Representative Clarence
Long of Maryland, Chairman of the House Appropriations
Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related
Agencies.u Evidently, the Department has concluded that the
disadvantages of determining a formula of eligibility, which
would eliminate the freedom to make exceptions for individual
circumstances, far outweigh the disadvantages of the present
flexible system in which aid to each country is subject to multi-
lateral bureaucratic negotiation and bargaining, with the result
29. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, CoUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES,
95TH CONG., 2D SESS. (Comm. Print 1978).
30. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies, Appropriations for 1978: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations 355, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Appropriations].
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that human rights sanctions are applied inconsistently. It is a
no-win situation, a dilemma for which there is no resolution in
sight. According to Assistant Secretary Derian: "I think that
the thing that would probably subvert our human rights initia-
tives more than anything is a grossly inconsistent pattern of
application.' Yet there is general agreement in the Depart-
ment (including HA), in Congress, and even among some non-
governmental promoters of human rights, that there will be
times when security considerations have to take precedence
over human rights. There may be differences of opinion over
specific security situations, but the principle is accepted. Iran,
Korea, and the Philippines are examples of countries which
continued to receive military aid in spite of serious human
rights violations.
A frequent complaint is that Latin America is a prime
example of the inconsistent application of our human rights
policy. Assuming that the human rights behavior of the Latin
American nations is no worse than those in other regions, this
region has received a disproportionate share of human rights
sanctions. But Latin America has always held a somewhat spe-
cial status in American arms transfer policy, according to a
RAND study by David Ronfeldt and Caesar Sereseres.
No other region-whether Africa, the Middle East, South Asia,
or Southeast Asia-has been so subject to critical U.S. treatment
and legislation as a region. Historically, the presumed homogene-
ity of nations and comparatively low threats to U.S. interest in
Latin America have made it easy to generalize and skip excep-
tions and distinctions that have stood out elsewhere, such as Iran,
South Korea, and the Philippines.
32
The new emphasis on human rights has served only to
reinforce an existing tendency in the U.S./Latin American
arms transfer policy; it did not cause it. In spite of President
Carter's efforts to assign greater importance to Latin America
in U.S. foreign policy, security considerations are relatively
unimportant in Latin America. Thus, human rights factors can
weigh more heavily in foreign policy decisions, a luxury not
available with respect to U.S. policy toward many of the coun-
tries of black Africa, the Middle East, or Asia.
31. Id. at 253.
32. Ronfeldt & Sereseres, U.S. Arms Transfers, Diplomacy, and Security in Latin
America and Beyond (October 1977) (Rand Paper P-6005), at 2-3.
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B. Phase Two-Congress
In addition to the evaluations prepared in the Executive
branch, as of 1978, hearings of the House International Rela-
tions Committee had been held on the human rights situations
in approximately twenty countries, and separate reports had
been requested and provided by the Congressional Research
Service on fifteen countries. These hearings and reports tend
to rely most heavily on unofficial, nongovernmental sources of
information, such as studies and testimony from NGOs, pri-
vate citizens, and church groups in the countries under consid-
eration.
Arms transfer recommendations from the Executive are
subject to modification or elimination in the appropriations
process. In some cases aid has been prohibited to countries not
included in the Administration's package. Aid was prohibited
to Vietnam, Uganda, Cambodia, Cuba, Laos, Angola, Brazil,
and Argentina in the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs
Appropriations Act of 1978.3
The same Act prohibited various categories of military as-
sistance to Uruguay, El Salvador, and Gutemala, and reduced
the amounts requested for the Philippines, all on human rights
grounds.Y Ethiopia was also dropped, as recommended by the
Administration, but less on human rights grounds than be-
cause of its growing relationship with the Soviet Union.
When Congress is in the mood to determine specific policy
details, bureaucratic battles lost in Phase One may be reversed
in Phase Two. This inevitably leads to informal alliances be-
tween like-minded participants in Congress and the bureauc-
racy. Although these relationships are not explored in the pres-
ent study, they deserve further attention.
C. Phase Three-Implementation
It is still possible to alter decisions emerging from Phases
One and Two in the presumably routine stage when the Execu-
tive actually obligates money, issues licenses, schedules deliv-
ery, etc. The report to Congress from the Secretary of State
serves notice that human rights considerations will be brought
33. Pub. L. No. 95-148, §§ 107, 114, 503B, and 506, 91 Stat. 1230, 1234, 1235,
1239, and 1240 (1977).
34. Id. §§ 503A, 503B, 503C.
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to bear again.3 Congress had expressed its displeasure over
human rights in Nicaragua by reducing the FY 1978 aid au-
thorization, and the Executive decided not to sign an aid
agreement with Nicaragua pending improvement in its human
rights situation .3 Later in the year, in response to a question
from the Fraser Subcommittee, the State Department pointed
out that even the signing of an agreement does not mean that
the money will be forthcoming. An agreement with Nicaragua
was signed for FY 1977, but no drawdown was requested by
Nicaragua. Under these circumstances, Nicaragua declined to
make a request for FY 1979 security assistance.
Human rights factors are applied to the implementation of
commercial sales licensing as well as security assistance. One
example is the M-16 sling swivel case. Nicaragua had pre-
viously purchased 5,000 M-16 rifles from Colt and discovered
that the sling swivels were corroded. In May of 1977, Colt re-
quested a permit to replace them. When HA refused to agree
on human rights grounds, the ensuing deadlock brought the
issue to the level of the Secretary of State, where no decision
was made, and none is likely-a sort of pocket veto. 7
There may also be attempts to stop a transaction, which
has already been concluded, short of delivery. HA attempted
unsuccessfully to block the sale of $9 million worth of Beech
aircraft to Argentina. It would have meant cancelling a good
faith contract for which, presumably, the company would have
to be compensated. The prospect brought interventions from
the Kansas congressional delegation and ultimately from the
White House.Y
V. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS
There is a good deal of unhappiness with a human rights
policy that is delineated and applied by people in the regional
bureaus, the overseas missions, and those parts of the DOD
involved in arms transfers. There are complaints that HA is
doctrinaire and is given to the use of delay tactics. It is felt by
many that the proper goals of U.S. diplomacy should be the
35. 123 CONG. Rac. S1424 (daily ed. -Dec. 7, 1977).
36. 1978 Appropriations, supra note 30, at 4.
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cultivation of favorable relations and influences with foreign
governments, and that an improvement in the treatment of
their own citizens should be, at most, a secondary objective.
Then there are those who believe that it is important for the
United States to use its influence to promote human rights
abroad, but that the methods should be confined to "quiet
diplomacy" rather than public evaluations and the denial of
aid as a form of punishment.
There is resistance, however, and although it is not possi-
ble under normal circumstances to bypass HA entirely, there
will be attempts to control information in the hope that HA can
be kept out of the picture long enough to develop a broader
constituency and momentum. To prevent this, the staff people
in HA try to "bird dog" issues so as not to be dependent on the
normal channels of information. Of course, effectiveness is de-
pendent on experience with the system. It takes time to tap the
informal information channels and sources of influence which
are present in any complex organization.
It is possible to bypass the system, however, if the White
House wants something in a hurry. According to Ellis Jones,
the original arms transfer policy officer, it took only two and a
half days to arrange arms transfer eligibility for Somalia, and
HA was confronted with a fait accompli. Even so, he estimated
that delivery can still take six months to a year. It is the opin-
ion of another participant/observer that fewer such instances
have occurred during the Carter administration than during
the Kissinger tenure.3 9
VI. CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS
Although both the House and Senate have participated in
the human rights movement, it is the House which plays the
more prominent role, in large part because it is the first to
review Administration appropriations requests, giving it the
initiative and greater visibility. The Senate often plays a mod-
erating role and provides the Executive with an opportunity to
reverse a setback in the House.
Not all members of Congress, or of the relevant commit-
tees, see eye to eye on the subject of human rights, and there
39. Interview with Priscilla Clapp, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (March
1978).
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are mixed motives among the supporters of sanctions against
countries. 0 The result has been the inadvertent alliance of
strange bedfellows: human rights crusaders who are anxious to
punish transgressors, along with anti-aid people who seek to
terminate giveaway programs and are delighted to be able to
obscure their real motives under the banner of human rights.
Arms transfer policy is somewhat less affected by this combina-
tion because much of it involves sales which do not require ap-
propriations, and also because anti-aid factions are more likely
to train their sights on economic assistance, including Ameri-
can participation and support for international financial insti-
tutions. Aid has also been opposed for purely parochial reasons
which are disguised as human rights concerns, such as the
protection of home district economic interests from foreign
competition.
Members of Congress who are in neither camp are placed
in a difficult position. For example, Congressman Charles Wil-
son of Texas, a member of the Long Subcommittee, is generally
supportive of foreign aid, but he feels that the President has
provided a handy club to opponents of assistance in the State
Department and in Congress with which to belabor the Admin-
istration's own program. In the absence of ranking, or formula
of eligibility, almost any country is open to attack on human
rights grounds."
The installation of the 96th Congress in January 1979 may
have marked the end of the era in congressional human rights
activism that began in 1973. Not only was Congressman Fraser
defeated in his bid for a Senate seat, but there was a move to
abolish his International Organizations Subcommittee alto-
gether. This was averted, but it is clear that the Chairman of
the International Relations Committee, Clement Zablocki,
does not intend to allow the subcommittee to play the same
activist role that it did under Fraser. The present Chairman,
Don Bonker of Washington, is a supporter of human rights but
does not have the comparable status and seniority of Fraser.
Other departures have thinned the ranks of human rights
advocates. In addition to Fraser, Joshua Eilberg of Pennsyl-
40. 1978 Appropriations, supra note 30, at 350.
41. Interview with Noel Holme, staff of Congressman Charles Wilson (March
1978).
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vania, Michael Harrington of Massachusetts, Helen S. Meyner
of New Jersey, Yvonne Burke, and Leo J. Ryan of California
are no longer on the scene. In the Senate, the death of Hubert
Humphrey and the defeat of Richard Clark of Iowa removed
two prominent human rights supporters. These and other
losses have eliminated the majority that previously supported,
for example, sanctions against Rhodesia.
The congressional attention span tends to be short and, in
any case, the more pressing issues of inflation, energy, and
arms control were bound to reduce legislative attention to-
wards human rights. But the era of activism established a leg-
acy of statutory provisions and organizational structures which
assures the human rights factor a role in the policymaking
process, despite the level of congressional or Executive interest.
VII. CONCLUSION
Human rights considerations have become an important
new element in the arms transfer decisionmaking process since
1977. The change came about because of congressional pres-
sure, organizational changes in the Department of State and,
most importantly, Presidential interest.
Congress led the human rights battle between 1973 and
1977 and made organizational changes to induce aid reductions
and terminations. The Ford administration complied only min-
imally with the congressional requirements, while its initia-
tives were designed to placate Congress and to deflect and
confine the issue to the ambit of international organizations.
American efforts to improve human rights were confined to
"quiet diplomacy," and changes were pursued bilaterally. Con-
gress, however, wanted that and much more. If the Ford ad-
ministration had remained in office after the election, a major
collision would probably have occurred over the issue of eco-
nomic and military assistance policies.
At the beginning of the Carter administration, concern was
expressed by human rights advocates in and out of Congress
that bureaucratic resistance would undermine the new Admin-
istration's efforts to effect genuine change in policy. 2 The
42. For an excellent analysis of the background and political undercurrents of the
Carter human rights policy see Drew, A Reporter at Large: Human Rights, New
Yorker, July 18, 1977, at 36.
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doubters soon realized however, that a real change had taken
place. Although the Administration toned down its public rhet-
oric, the subject of human rights violations in other nations has
become a major consideration in the decisionmaking process.
Differences between the Carter administration and Con-
gress arose over economic assistance and U.S. participation in
international financial institutions, rather than over the arms
transfer policy. Nonetheless, the implementation and applica-
tion of an arms transfer policy based on human rights consider-
ations is difficult. Inconsistent application is particularly acute
as it is generally recognized that exceptions must be made on
national security grounds, while exceptions to nonmilitary
forms of assistance are more difficult to justify. Evaluating and
comparing the human rights performance of governments is
difficult. There is inevitably disagreement over the basis of a
valid claim for exemption or the extent to which any given
country has changed its human rights performance. The evi-
dence available is always conflicting, except for such pariahs
as Uganda, Cambodia, and North Korea. Nevertheless, there
is evidence, and for this reason much of the argument within
the bureaucracy tends to center on questions of performance
rather than security. It is easier for human rights advocates to
argue, for example, that the human rights situation in the Phil-
ippines has not improved, or has worsened, than to contend
that the Philippines is not sufficiently important to American
security interest in Asia to justify an aid grant in spite of
human rights violations.
The security factor tends to prevail, however, particularly
in countries with a major American military presence, such as
the Philippines, South Korea, and formerly, Iran. The Carter
administration requested $95.7 million in military assistance
for the Philippines in FY 1980, triple the amount requested for
FY 1979. The Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the
House Foreign Relations Committee voted to delete $7.9 mil-
lion on human rights grounds, but the amount was restored by
a 14-11 vote in the full Committee. 3 At the same time, cuts in
aid to several Latin American countries were sustained, thus
continuing the tradition of allowing human rights considera-
43. Felton, House Panel Backs Military Aid Request for Philippines, 37 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 542 (1979).
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tions to weigh more heavily in decisions regarding aid to that
region.
It may be possible to avoid the appearance and the reality
of "chaos," but inconsistency is endemic to any policy absent
a precise formula. This insures that foreign assistance policy-
making will continue to be contentious, and the proper weight
to be given to human rights considerations in policy decisions
will remain a source of controversy.
